Monetary Policy in an Oil-Dependent Economy in the Presence of Multiple Shocks

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Gliederung

Introduction

2 Model

3 Estimation results and policy evaluation

In a nutshell

- How can monetary policy in Russia reduce the impacts of shocks to the oil price and capital flows?
- Estimation of a DSGE model for Russia (2000 to mid-2015)
- Extension of a standard small open economy model by Justiniano and Preston (JAE, 2010)
 - Oil exporting sector
 - Micro-founded FX market (Bacchetta and van Wincoop (AER, 2006), Montoro and Ortiz (2013), Malovana (2015))
- Transmission channels of central bank interventions (direct and expectations)
- ► Novelty: estimation of a model with endogenous FX market interventions

Stylized facts

Devaluation pressure on the Russian currency due to

- Large capital outflows
- Collapse of the oil price
- Problems of refinancing external debt due to financial sanctions
- Exchange rate management by the central bank to "limit excessive value fluctuations"of the dual-currency basket
 - Policy rate increases
 - Sales of FX reserves
- Exchange rate policy officially abandoned on November 7, 2014
- Currency devaluation at most delayed but hardly prevented, but potential negative impact on economic activity (through increased borrowing costs)

Empirical evidence

Malakhovskaya/Minabutdinov (2013):

- Estimated DSGE model of the Russian economy (1999 to 2011)
- Comparable setting 2008/09: large capital outflows, slump in oil prices
- Restrictive monetary policy aimed at exchange rate stabilization
- Prevented (stronger) rouble depreciation
- Fueled economic downturn (and reduced oil revenue value in roubles)
- Russian monetary policy described by the presence of two targets
 - Price stability
 - Exchange rate stability
- and is conducted via two instruments
 - Monetary policy rate
 - FX market interventions

Outline

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Mode

FX market

- Continuum of dealers d in the domestic economy in the interval $d \in [0,1]$
- Each dealer receives
 - ω_t^d and $\omega_{cb,t}^d$ in domestic bond sale and purchase orders from households and the central banks
 - $\blacktriangleright \ \omega_t^{d,*}$ and $\omega_{cb,t}^{d,*}$ in foreign bond sale orders from foreign investors and the central bank
- Ex-post holdings of domestic and foreign bonds by dealer *d* are

$$B_t^d + e_t B^{d,*} = \omega_t^d - \omega_{cb,t}^d + e_t(\omega_t^{d,*} + \omega_{cb,t}^{d,*})$$

 Dealers select optimal portfolio allocation in order to maximize the expected utility of their end-of-period returns

Mode

FX market

▶ Dealers select optimal portfolio allocation in order to maximize the expected utility of their end-of-period returns -E^d_te^{-γΩ^d_{t+1}}

$$\Omega_{t+1}^{d} = (1+i_t)B_t^{d} + (1+i_t^*)e_{t+1}B_t^{d,*}$$

- Each dealer's demand for foreign bonds dependent on interest rate difference, expected exchange rate dynamics, risk aversion and exchange rate volatility
- Aggregation of all dealers and equilibrium condition on the FX market leads to a risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity condition (in logs):

$$E_t e_{t+1} - e_t = r_t - r_t^* + \gamma \sigma_{\Delta e}^2 (\omega_t^* + \omega_{cb,t}^*)$$

nominal exchange rate e_t , interest rate difference $r_t - r_t^*$, risk aversion γ , exchange rate volatility $\sigma_{\Delta e}^2$ and supply of foreign bonds from investors ω_t^* and the central bank $\omega_{cb,t}^*$

FX market

Supply of foreign bonds by foreign investors (capital inflows)

$$\omega_t^* = \rho_{\omega^*} \omega_{t-1}^* + \eta_t^{\omega^*}$$

Supply of foreign bonds by central bank (intervention)

$$\omega_{cb,t}^* = \phi_{\Delta e,int} \Delta e_t + \eta_t^{\omega^{int}}$$

with i.i.d. shocks $\eta_t^{\omega^*} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\eta^{\omega^*}}^2)$ and $\eta_t^{\omega^{int}} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\eta^{\omega^{int}}}^2)$

Mode

FX market

$$E_t e_{t+1} - e_t = r_t - r_t^* + \gamma \sigma_{\Delta e}^2(\omega_t^* + \omega_{cb,t}^*)$$

- Interventions have an impact on the exchange rate via two channels
- Portfolio balance channel $\gamma \sigma^2_{\Delta e}(\omega_t^* + \omega_{cb,t}^*)$
 - Sale (purchase) of foreign bonds by the CB increases (reduces) the ratio between foreign and domestic assets held by dealers
 - Appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency, because dealers require a greater (smaller) risk premium to hold a larger (smaller) quantity of the foreign currency
- Signaling channel $E_t e_{t+1}$
 - CB interventions signal future changes in policy that affect expectations
 - Change in $E_t e_{t+1}$ caused by FX interventions will have an effect on the spot exchange rate

> Oil sector revenues (in domestic currency) distributed to private households

$$Y_t^O = P_t^O e_t$$

- All demand is satisfied, variations in the revenues result from fluctuations in the dollar price of oil and the exchange rate
- ▶ Oil price follows an exogenous AR(1) process (in logs)

$$\boldsymbol{p}_t^O = \rho_O \boldsymbol{p}_{t-1}^O + \eta_t^O$$


Outline

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
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Actual and smoothed interventions



Historical decomposition real exchange rate



Policy evaluation

- Simulation of the model with parameters calibrated to their estimated posterior means
- Shock to oil prices, capital flows and both disturbances occurring simultaneously
- Dual shock scenario calibrated to match correlation of smoothed shock series
- Estimated policy in place (baseline) compared to five alternative policy strategies:
 - Inflation targeting (reaction parameter 1.5)
 - ► Strict inflation targeting (reaction parameter ∞)
 - Fix exchange rate (reaction parameter in intervention rule ∞)
 - Ruble price of oil targeting (reaction parameter in intervention rule ∞)
 - Hybrid inflation targeting (reaction parameters 1.5 and 0.5)

Alternative policy strategies

Inflation targeting via policy rate

- ▶ No active exchange rate management → monetary policy adjusted such that effects on import prices are balanced by opposite dynamics of domestic prices
- Smaller impact of dual shocks on GDP aggregates, wages and inflation; higher volatility of domestic inflation
- Differences to current policy larger the stronger the policy reaction to price dynamics
- Fix exchange rate via interventions
 - \blacktriangleright No independent monetary policy \rightarrow interest rate not used as a policy instrument
 - \blacktriangleright Identical dynamics of oil prices in domestic currency \rightarrow stronger impact on domestic wages and prices
 - \blacktriangleright Monetary policy not capable to prevent them from rising \rightarrow significantly higher volatility of total inflation

Alternative policy strategies

- Ruble price of oil targeting via interventions
 - Peg the export price index (Frankel (JPM, 2005))
 - Credible anchor for monetary policy, accommodation of terms of trade shocks, reliable real time data
 - \blacktriangleright No independent monetary policy \rightarrow interest rate not used as a policy instrument
 - ► Central bank reinforces initial exchange rate dynamics → higher volatility of import prices, total inflation and trade aggregates
 - Inadequate strategy to absorb oil price shocks

Conclusion and outlook

- Russian economy best shed from shocks to oil prices and capital flows by adopting any form of inflation targeting
- Discrete interventions to counter discrete destabilizing capital flows
- However, simplifying model assumptions
 - \blacktriangleright Oil prices and capital flows follow AR(1) processes \rightarrow no persistent effects
 - Capital flows have no effects on variables besides the exchange rate and are completely exogenous, i.e. random
 - Influenced by political arbitrariness and non-existent rule of law ightarrow endogenize
 - \blacktriangleright Provide/pull out funds for productive capital formation \rightarrow include in investment function

Thank you very much for your attention.