

Foreign Investment and Domestic Productivity: New Evidence on the Role of Competition and Knowledge Spillovers

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Introduction

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- ▶ How does the productivity of **non-acquired** domestic firms change upon entry of MNCs?

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- ▶ Policy question: Should we promote policies for foreign agro firms (such as Cargill, Inc. of the U.S.) to build plants in Ukraine?
 - ▶ During the 1990s, the answer seemed to be unambiguously yes (the Washington Consensus for developing countries).

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- ▶ How does the productivity of **non-acquired** domestic firms change upon entry of MNCs?
- ▶ Policy question: Should we promote policies for foreign agro firms (such as Cargill, Inc. of the U.S.) to build plants in Ukraine?
 - ▶ During the 1990s, the answer seemed to be unambiguously yes (the Washington Consensus for developing countries).
 - ▶ **Specifically:** How are Ukrainian **non-acquired** firms in agro commodities and related sectors affected by entry of MNCs? Do we need to support them against foreign competition?

Any academic research that supported this trend? Yes

Empirical international macro literature:

Using aggregate cross-country data, found a stylized fact: positive correlation between FDI and growth

Theoretical economic growth models:

Claim that long-run growth only through improvements in technology and innovation (work by Lucas, Aghion, Romer)

Policy push:

- ▶ Bringing foreign technology and know-how is the single most important factor to achieve sustainable long-run growth

Problems with previous macroeconomics finding

Correlation does not imply *economic causality*.

Econometric specification: $\text{Growth}_{i,t} = \beta \text{FDI}_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$,
where i =country and t =year.


Possible channels at work:

- ▶ An increase in FDI leads to more growth (X causes Y)
- ▶ Growing countries attract more FDI (Y causes X)
- ▶ Better institutions and rule of law lead to more FDI and growth (Z causes X,Y)

Need for more precise econometric work using more granular data!
Do results hold if we rather use **firm-level** datasets?

Notions in FDI literature: Horizontal vs. Vertical FDI


Example: Consider the following observed supplier-user relationship between two 2-digit sectors implied by the input-output table.



- ▶ Magnitude of spillovers is proxied by **sector-level** foreign output.
- ▶ Horizontal FDI spillovers: between firms within a sector.
- ▶ Vertical FDI spillovers: between firms in supplier-user sectors.

Notions in FDI literature: Horizontal vs. Vertical FDI

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- ▶ Vertical FDI spillovers: between firms in supplier-user sectors.

What is the evidence on productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms using firm-level data?

Evidence on productivity spillovers from firm-level data

- ▶ Horizontal FDI spillovers: **mixed results**
 - ▶ Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2007) and Keller and Yeaple (2009) positive in the U.K. and the U.S.
 - ▶ Aitken and Harrison (1999) negative in Venezuela.
 - ▶ Javorcik (2004), Blalock and Gertler (2008), Barrios, Gorg and Strobl (2011) no effect in Lithuania, Indonesia and Ireland.
- ▶ Vertical FDI spillovers: **overwhelming positive results:**
 - ▶ Javorcik (2004), Blalock and Gertler (2008).

Evidence on productivity spillovers from firm-level data

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 - ▶ Javorcik (2004), Blalock and Gertler (2008), Barrios, Gorg and Strobl (2011) no effect in Lithuania, Indonesia and Ireland.
- ▶ Vertical FDI spillovers: **overwhelming positive results:**
 - ▶ Javorcik (2004), Blalock and Gertler (2008).
- ▶ **Important:** So far, the literature measures spillovers at broad 2-digit sector level.

This paper

- ▶ Revisit the issue of *identifying horizontal spillovers* at the two-digit industry level.
- ▶ Address the limitations of the previous literature:
 - ▶ Aggregate 2-digit sector does not allow to separate **knowledge spillovers** from **competition effects**.

This paper

- ▶ Revisit the issue of *identifying horizontal spillovers* at the two-digit industry level.
- ▶ Address the limitations of the previous literature:
 - ▶ Aggregate 2-digit sector does not allow to separate **knowledge spillovers** from **competition effects**.
 - ▶ One-country approach makes **causal** interpretation harder (global sectoral tech shocks) .

Contribution: Break down 2-digit “horizontal spillover” into “competition effects” and “knowledge spillovers”

Example: Valinox Nucleaire

Let France be the host country and take domestically-owned manufacturer of steel tubing for nuclear steam generation *Valinox Nucleaire*.

- ▶ 2-dgt sector 24 “Manuf. of basic metals” (as in the literature).
- ▶ 4-dgt sector 2420 “Manuf. of tubes, pipes, of steel” (our paper).
- ▶ *Valinox* records TFP growth of 25% during 2000-2008.

We break down the effect of MNC on TFP according to their presence:

1. In the same 4-digit sector (direct product market competitors).
2. In the same 2-digit sector (non-direct product market competitors – maybe close in the “technology space”).

Contribution: Break down 2-digit “horizontal spillover”

Example: Domestic *Valinox* in sect.2420 “Manuf. of tubes”

In the same 4-digit sector in France we find *Salzgitter Mannesmann Precision (SMP)*, fully-owned subsidiary of the German global leader in the line pipes and precision tubes sector Salzgitter AG.

We identify the within 4-digit sector effects:

- ▶ **Claim 1:** Because *Valinox* and *SMP* are in the same 4-digit sector they are direct product competitors (negative **market competition effects**).
- ▶ **Claim 2:** Some positive knowledge may spillover from *SMP* to *Valinox* if the two companies are close in the technology space (positive **horizontal knowledge spillovers**).

Contribution: Break down 2-digit “horizontal spillover”

Example: Domestic *Valinox* in sect.2420 “Manuf. of tubes”

In the same 2-digit sector in France we find *Constellium Montreuil*, fully-owned subsidiary of the Dutch leading supplier of aluminium products for aerospace, transportation, and defense Constellium NV (sector 2442 “Aluminium production”).

We identify the within 2-digit sector (outside the 4-digit) effects:

- ▶ **Claim 1:** *Valinox* and *Constellium* are in different segments \Rightarrow no product market competitors. We verified no commercial relationship between the two.
- ▶ **Claim 2:** Aluminium and steel share similar design problems/processes and rules (e.g., 31% of patents registered by firms in sect.2420 overlap with those in sect.2442) \Rightarrow some positive knowledge may spill over from *Constellium* to *Valinox* (positive **vertical knowledge spillovers**).

Data

Firm-level data:

- ▶ Internationally harmonized administrative micro-datasets ORBIS and AMADEUS
- ▶ Balance sheet data (output-turnover, materials, employment, wage bill, capital, etc.) to estimate outcomes ▶ TFP estimation
- ▶ Ownership data: time varying information on ownership stakes ▶ Coverage
- ▶ We focus on 6 European countries (1999-2008): BE, ES, FI, FR, IT, NO.
- ▶ Select firms >10 employees (90% of total manufacturing).

Firm-patent match, Europe: Sector technology closeness

- ▶ source: Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016);
- ▶ Orbis-Amadeus matched to European patents (the European Patent Office).
- ▶ Variable: number of granted patents per firm.

U.S. input-output table for 2007: Sector vertical linkages

- ▶ source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis;
- ▶ firm-to-firm information on sales is not available → IO tables used to measure input flows across industries;
- ▶ European countries do not provide IO tables at the 4 digit industry level;

Traditional Measures of Spillovers - Product Based

- ▶ Horizontal Spillovers: A measure of MNC presence in the same 4-digit sector (**HORIZONTAL**).

$$\text{HORIZONTAL}_{s4,c,t} = \frac{\sum_{i \in s4} fo_{i,c,t} \times go_{i,c,t}}{\sum_{i \in s4} go_{i,c,t}}$$

where $fo_{i,c,t}$ is firm's foreign ownership stake and $go_{i,c,t}$ is firm's revenue.

- ▶ Vertical Spillovers: A measure of MNC presence adjusted for the input-output relationships within the same 2-digit but outside the 4-digit (**VERTICAL_IO**).

$$\text{VERTICAL_IO}_{s4,c,t} = \sum_{\substack{\tilde{s}4 \in s2(s4) \\ \tilde{s}4 \neq s4}} \alpha_{s4,\tilde{s}4,t} \times \text{HORIZONTAL}_{\tilde{s}4,c,t},$$

where $\alpha_{s4,\tilde{s}4,t}$ is the I-O coefficient – fraction of output that sector $s4$ supplies as input to each given sector $\tilde{s}4$.

New Measures of Spillovers - Technology Based

We construct two sector measures, relying on the work of Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) to capture **sectoral technological closeness**.

- ▶ Horizontal Technology Spillover: A measure of MNC presence adjusted for the technology closeness of firms operating in the same 4-digit sector (**HORIZONTAL_TEC**).

$$\text{HORIZONTAL_TEC}_{s4,c,t} = \text{WTECH}_{s4,s4,c,t} \times \text{HORIZONTAL}_{s4,c,t} . \quad (1)$$

- ▶ Vertical Technology Spillover: A measure of MNC presence adjusted for the technology closeness of firms operating within the same 2-digit but outside the 4-digit (**VERTICAL_TEC**).

$$\text{VERTICAL_TEC}_{s4,c,t} = \sum_{\substack{\tilde{s4} \in s2(s4) \\ \tilde{s4} \neq s4}} \text{WTECH}_{s4,\tilde{s4},c,t} \times \text{HORIZONTAL}_{\tilde{s4},c,t} , \quad (2)$$

- ▶ **WTECH** captures sectoral technological closeness and economic size of the sectors. [▶ Details](#)

Results - Horizontal spillovers in the same 4-digit sector

DEPENDENT VAR.: log FIRM REVENUE TFP. SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS

$$\log(\text{TFPR}_{i,s4,c,t}) = \beta_1 \text{HORIZONTAL}_{s4,c,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{HORIZONTAL_TEC}_{s4,c,t-1} + \alpha_i + \phi_{s4,t} + \delta_{c,t} + \epsilon_{i,s4,c,t}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HORIZONTAL _{s4,c,t-1}	-0.094* (0.047)	-0.173*** (0.047)		-0.330*** (0.079)
HORIZONTAL_TEC _{s4,c,t-1}			-0.033 (0.052)	0.228** (0.078)
Observations	322,516	322,516	322,516	322,516
Firm FE and Country-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sec4-Year FE		✓	✓	✓

Notes: GLS. Cluster at c-s4-y. s.d.(HORIZONTAL)=0.16; s.d.(HORIZONTAL_TEC)=0.07.

Interpretation: Coefficient of -0.173 implies that a one std. dev. increase in foreign presence decreases domestic firms' productivity by about 0.17 percent.

- ▶ Within 4dig: large knowledge spillovers off-set by negatv. comp. effects.
- ▶ The positive will dominate in sectors that are technologically close.

Results - Technology Spillovers and Vertical Linkages

Four potential channels!

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: \log FIRM REVENUE TFP. SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS

$$\log(\text{TFPR}_{i,s4,c,t}) = \beta_1 \text{HORIZONTAL}_{s4,c,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{HORIZONTAL_TEC}_{s4,c,t-1} + \beta_3 \text{VERTICAL_TEC}_{s4,c,t-1} + \beta_4 \text{VERTICAL_IO}_{s4,c,t-1} + \alpha_i + \phi_{s2,t} + \delta_{c,t} + \epsilon_{i,s4,c,t}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VERTICAL_TEC _{s4,c,t-1}	0.237*** (0.059)		0.207*** (0.059)	0.207*** (0.059)	0.237*** (0.059)
VERTICAL_IO _{s4,c,t-1}		0.113** (0.035)	0.057 (0.042)	0.064 (0.042)	
HORIZONTAL _{s4,c,t-1}				-0.330*** (0.079)	-0.330*** (0.079)
HORIZONTAL_TEC _{s4,c,t-1}				0.254** (0.078)	0.247** (0.078)
Observations	322516	322516	322516	322516	322516
Firm FE, Country-Year FE, Sec4-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: GLS. Cluster at c-s4-y. s.d.(HORIZONTAL)=0.16; s.d.(HORIZONTAL_TEC)=0.07; s.d.(VERTICAL_TEC)=0.15; s.d.(VERTICAL_IO)=0.07

Results so far and their policy implications

- ▶ Amount of knowledge spillovers from FDI depends not just on **how much** foreign investment there is but also, critically, on **in which firms** FDI takes place.
- ▶ Productivity enhancing effects of FDI for local firms will depend on the interaction between high FDI into **high technological sectors** that are **close in technology space**.

Results - Timing of Impacts

SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent Variable:	$\Delta^{j=1} \log \text{TFPR}$	$\Delta^{j=2} \log \text{TFPR}$	$\Delta^{j=4} \log \text{TFPR}$
$\Delta^j \text{HORIZONTAL}_{s4,c}$	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.013** (0.005)
$\Delta^j \text{HORIZONTAL_TEC}_{s4,c}$	-0.001 (0.016)	0.022 (0.015)	0.035** (0.012)
$\Delta^j \text{VERTICAL_TEC}_{s4,c}$	0.002 (0.005)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.048*** (0.004)
Observations	373,960	172,521	72,638
Firm FE			
Country-Year FE, Sec4-Year FE	✓	✓	✓

Notes: GLS. Cluster at c-s4-y. Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2007) in the UK find 6.3 percent increase in productivity for five-year differences.

Technology or Pricing?

- ▶ Our measured firm productivity, is **revenue** TFP.

$$\text{TFPR}_{it} \equiv P_{it} \text{TFPQ}_{it} = \mu_{it} \times \text{MC}_{it} \times \text{TFPQ}_{it}$$
, where P_{it} is firm output price and TFPQ_{it} is physical productivity and MC_{it} is the marginal cost.
- ▶ **Important issue**: Markups may respond endogenously to competition.
- ▶ No firm-specific prices to isolate the physical productivity TFPQ_{it} (common problem in the literature).
- ▶ We follow De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), compute firm-level markups, and study
 - ✓ whether the spillovers result in higher domestic firms' markups; and
 - ✓ what part of the change in TFPR induced by the spillovers is driven by higher markups and how much by physical productivity. [▶ Details](#)

Results - Revenue TFP and Markups

SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS				
Dependent Variable:	(1) log(TFPR)	(2) log(μ)	(3) MC	(4) Implied log(TFPQ)
HORIZONTAL _{s4,c,t-1}	-0.330*** (0.079)	-0.220** (0.063)	0.110*** (0.031)	-0.220** (0.105)
HORIZONTAL _{TEC} _{s4,c,t-1}	0.247** (0.078)	0.104 (0.072)	-0.052* (0.026)	0.195* (0.109)
VERTICAL _{TEC} _{s4,c,t-1}	0.237*** (0.059)	0.104** (0.059)	-0.148*** (0.030)	0.281*** (0.089)
Observations	322516	322516	322516	
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	
Country-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	
Sec4-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	

Notes: GLS. Cluster at c-s4-y. s.d.(HORIZONTAL)=0.16; s.d.(HORIZONTAL_{TEC})=0.07; s.d.(VERTICAL_{TEC})=0.15

- Increase competition decreases markups and increases MC due to lower scale of production.
- Knowledge spillovers decrease marginal cost.

Results - Direct Evidence on Technology Spillovers

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: $\log(\text{Patents} + 1)$		
SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS		
	Full Sample (1)	Permanent Sample (2)
$\text{HORIZONTAL}_{s4,c,t-1}$	-0.094** (0.047)	-0.258** (0.081)
$\text{VERTICAL_TEC}_{s4,c,t-1}$	0.178*** (0.044)	0.210** (0.075)
$\text{HORIZONTAL_TEC}_{s4,c,t-1}$	0.039 (0.052)	0.236** (0.083)
Observations	322516	101408
Firm FE, Country-Year FE, Sec4-Year FE	✓	✓

Notes: OLS. Cluster at c-s4-y. s.d.(HORIZONTAL)=0.16;
s.d.(HORIZONTAL_TEC)=0.07; s.d.(VERTICAL_TEC)=0.15

Results - Robustness

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: \log FIRM REVENUE TFP
SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS

	(1) Benchmark	(2) Permanent	(3) OLS	(4) empl10	(5) sec2-year	(6) HHN
$HORIZONTAL_{s4,c,t-1}$	-0.330*** (0.079)	-0.533*** (0.129)	-0.361** (0.173)	-0.485*** (0.097)	-0.503*** (0.079)	-0.283*** (0.079)
$HORIZONTAL_TEC_{s4,c,t-1}$	0.247** (0.078)	0.586*** (0.153)	0.111 (0.189)	0.300** (0.093)	0.638*** (0.078)	0.312*** (0.078)
$VERTICAL_TEC_{s4,c,t-1}$	0.237*** (0.059)	0.406** (0.120)	0.326** (0.133)	0.348*** (0.061)	0.311*** (0.059)	0.207*** (0.059)
$HERFIN_{s4,c,t-1}$						-0.582*** (0.116)
Observations	322516	101408	322516	221767	322523	322516
Firm FE, Country-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sec4-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Sec2-Year FE					✓	

Notes: GLS. Cluster at c-s4-y. s.d.(HORIZONTAL)=0.16; s.d.(HORIZONTAL_TEC)=0.07;
s.d.(VERTICAL_TEC)=0.15
s.d.(HERFIN)=1.16

Predicted Effects of Increases in FDI

Aim: quantify the average effects implied by changes in foreign ownership of a certain magnitude.

SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS

		(1)=(2)+(3)+(4)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ fo	Targeted Sectors	$\Delta \log \text{TFPR}$	$\Delta \text{HORIZONTAL}$	$\Delta \text{HORIZONTAL_TEC}$	$\Delta \text{VERTICAL_TEC}$
10%	Across the Board Increase	0.10	-0.21	0.15	0.16
20%	Highly Connected Sectors	0.21	-0.32	0.27	0.26
20%	Less Connected Sectors	-0.13	-0.20	0.02	0.05

- ▶ An increase in foreign ownership of 10 percentage points leads to a predicted increase in productivity of 0.10 percent.
- ▶ FDI in those 50 percent of sectors that are closest to other sectors in technology space on average \Rightarrow predicted TFP effect is twice as large (0.21 percent).
- ▶ FDI in those 50 percent of sectors that are least connected to other sectors in technology space on average \Rightarrow negative spillovers (-0.13)

Results - Citation channel of knowledge spillovers

SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS			
Dependent Variable:	(1) log(TFPR)	(2) log(TFPR)	(3) log(TFPR)
HORIZONTAL _{s4,t-1}	-0.330*** (0.079)	-0.320*** (0.080)	-0.256*** (0.035)
HORIZONTAL_TEC _{s4,t-1}	0.247** (0.078)	0.243** (0.076)	
VERTICAL_TEC _{s4,t-1}	0.237** (0.059)		
VERTICAL_TEC _{s4,t-1} ^{CIT}		0.207*** (0.059)	0.177*** (0.059)
HORIZONTAL_TEC _{s4,t-1} ^{CIT}			0.142* (0.087)
Observations	322516	322516	322516
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓
Country-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Sec4-Year FE	✓	✓	✓

Notes: GLS. Cluster at c-s4-y. [▶ Citation Matrix](#)

Conclusion

- ▶ We identify knowledge spillovers from foreign investment to domestic firms using novel measures of “closeness” of foreign-owned and domestic firms in the product and technology space.
 1. separate competition effects on domestic firms from knowledge spillovers when domestic and foreign-owned firms are close in product space,
 2. identify spillovers from foreign-owned firms that are close to domestic firms in technology space.

Conclusion

- ▶ We identify knowledge spillovers from foreign investment to domestic firms using novel measures of “closeness” of foreign-owned and domestic firms in the product and technology space.
 - 1. separate competition effects on domestic firms from knowledge spillovers when domestic and foreign-owned firms are close in product space,
 - 2. identify spillovers from foreign-owned firms that are close to domestic firms in technology space.
- ▶ We find significant effects for productivity of domestic firms as a result of the MNC presence within the same broad 2-dgt sector.
 - ✓ When MNCs enter the same four-digit sector as domestic firms, knowledge spillovers are fully off-set by negative competition effects.
 - ✓ Knowledge spillovers from MNCs that are close in technology space are positive and highly significant.
- ▶ The benefits for a host country from foreign investment is highly dependent on which sectors this investment takes place.

Thank you for attention!

New Spillovers Measures - Technology Based (Details)

- ▶ We construct two sector measures:
 - ▶ A measure of technology closeness of firms operating in the same four-digit sector ([HORIZONTAL.TEC](#)).
 - ▶ A measure of technology closeness of firms operating within the same two-digit but outside the four-digit ([VERTICAL.TEC](#)).
- ▶ We rely on the work of Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013)
 - ▶ U.S. firm level Compustat data
 - ▶ Calculate the average share of patents each firm holds in each of the 426 technology classes over the period 1980-2001.
 - ▶ Define for each firm “ i ” its vector of technological activity:
 $t_i = (t_{i1}, t_{i2}, \dots, t_{i426})$ where t_{ix} is the share of patents of firm i in technology class x .
 - ▶ For each firm pair i, j construct measures of technology closeness.

Spillovers New Measures - Technology Based (Details)

- **Firm technology closeness:** Following Jaffe(1986) compute the uncentered correlation of patent share vectors t_i and t_j

$$\text{tech}_{ij} = \frac{(t_i t_j')}{(t_i t_i')^{1/2} (t_j t_j')^{1/2}} . \quad (3)$$

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- **Sector technology closeness:** Aggregate to the sector level - for each four-digit sector pair, we compute the *sectoral* technological closeness as the R&D-weighted sum of the technology closeness of firms operating in sector pairs $s4$ and $\tilde{s}4$

$$\text{SPILL_RD}_{s4, \tilde{s}4} = \sum_{i \in s4} \sum_{j \in \tilde{s}4} \text{tech}_{ij} \times \underbrace{\left(\frac{r_i + r_j}{\sum_{k \in s4} \sum_{l \in \tilde{s}4} (r_k + r_l)} \right)}_{\text{R\&D weight}}, \quad (4)$$

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$$SPILL_RD_{s4, \tilde{s}4} = \sum_{i \in s4} \sum_{j \in \tilde{s}4} tech_{ij} \times \underbrace{\left(\frac{r_i + r_j}{\sum_{k \in s4} \sum_{l \in \tilde{s}4} (r_k + r_l)} \right)}_{\text{R\&D weight}}, \quad (4)$$

- **Relative importance of the sector:** We introduce weights that reflect the economic importance of the four-digit sectors $\tilde{s}4$ that are technologically linked to a given four-digit sector $s4$

$$WTECH_{s4, \tilde{s}4, t} = \frac{SPILL_RD_{s4, \tilde{s}4} \times GO_{\tilde{s}4, t}}{\sum_{\substack{\tilde{s}4 \in s2(s4) \\ \tilde{s}4 \neq s4}} SPILL_RD_{s4, \tilde{s}4} \times GO_{\tilde{s}4, t}}, \quad (5)$$

Spillovers New Measures - Technology Based (Details)

- ▶ Vertical Technology Spillover:

$$\text{VERTICAL_TEC}_{s4,t} = \sum_{\substack{\tilde{s4} \in s2(s4) \\ \tilde{s4} \neq s4}} \text{WTECH}_{s4,\tilde{s4},t} \times \text{HORIZONTAL}_{\tilde{s4},t} , \quad (6)$$

- ▶ Horizontal Technology Spillover:

$$\text{HORIZONTAL_TEC}_{s4,t} = \text{WTECH}_{s4,s4,t} \times \text{HORIZONTAL}_{s4,t} . \quad (7)$$

▶ Back

Technology or Pricing?

- Revenue total factor productivity:

$$\text{TFPR}_{it} \equiv P_{it} \text{TFPQ}_{it} = \mu_{it} \times \text{MC}_{it} \times \text{TFPQ}_{it}, \quad (8)$$

- Turning to percentage changes (denoted by Δ) and re-arranging, change in physical productivity:

$$\Delta \text{TFPQ}_{it} = \Delta \text{TFPR}_{it} - \Delta \mu_{it} - \Delta \text{MC}_{it}. \quad (9)$$

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- **Markup** estimation following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)

$$\mu_{it} \equiv \frac{P_{it}}{\text{MC}_{it}} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial \mathcal{F}_{it}(\cdot)}{\partial \mathcal{J}_{it}} \frac{\mathcal{J}_{it}}{\mathcal{F}_{it}(\cdot)}}_{\text{OutputElasticity}} / \underbrace{\frac{P_{it}^{\mathcal{J}_{it}} \mathcal{J}_{it}}{P_{it} y_{it}}}_{\text{ExpenditureShare}}, \quad (10)$$


P_{it} is the output price, MC_{it} is marginal cost, $\mathcal{F}_{it}(\cdot)$ is the production function, \mathcal{J}_{it} is inputs, and $P_{it} y_{it}$ is nominal value added.

- **Marginal Cost** approximated with Average Cost: (material and wage cost normalized by revenue) [► Back](#)

Citation Matrix from Acemoglu, Akcigit, Kerr (2016)

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Citation matrix, 1975-1984.



Effect of customer-supplier relationships

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: \log FIRM REVENUE TFP. SAMPLE: DOMESTIC FIRMS
VERTICAL SPILLOVERS INSPIRED BY JAVORCIK (2004) BUT AT 4-DGT

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VERTICAL_TEC _{s4,t-1}	0.296***	0.281***	0.370***	0.370***	0.326***
HORIZONTAL _{s4,t-1}	-0.503***	-0.503***	-0.503***	-0.519***	-0.471***
HORIZONTAL_TEC _{s4,t-1}	0.617***	0.644***	0.677***	0.703***	0.794***
BACKWARD_WITHIN _{2s4,t-1}		0.042	0.035	-0.007	0.035
BACKWARD_OUT _{2s4,t-1}		0.146**	0.120**	0.051	0.051
BACKWARDTECH_OUT _{2s4,t-1}			0.989***	1.054***	1.126***
\log DEMAND _{s4,t-1}				0.942***	0.837***
\log HERFIN _{s4,t-1}					-0.582***
Observations	323,730	322,523	322,523	322,523	322,523
Cluster	cs4y	cs4y	cs4y	cs4y	cs4y

Notes: Backward spillover measures are a weighted sum of the foreign presence in industries that are being supplied by sector s_4 .

GLS. Firm, Country-Year, Sec2-Year FE included. Coefficients are standardized

Our data covers large portion of the output (Turnover) from Eurostat

Value of total output from our firm-level data relative to value of total output produced by Eurostat (SBS).

	Belgium	Finland	France	Italy	Spain	Norway
A: Total Economy						
2000	0.65	0.40	0.57	0.50	0.64	0.63
2004	0.63	0.51	0.70	0.57	0.68	0.67
2006	0.62	0.51	0.68	0.58	0.71	0.67
2008	0.73	0.57	0.79	0.72	0.80	0.59
B: Manufacturing Sector						
2000	0.8	0.34	0.76	0.66	0.77	0.60
2004	0.8	0.41	0.83	0.73	0.79	0.72
2006	0.78	0.4	0.84	0.79	0.83	0.75
2008	0.78	0.49	0.9	0.9	0.85	0.69

Notes: [▶ back](#)

Our data matches well the Eurostat by size distribution in manufacturing

The share of gross output (turnover) accounted for by firms belonging in three size categories in the year 2006.

	Belgium	Finland	France	Italy	Spain	Norway
A: ORBIS-AMADEUS						
1 to 19 employees	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.12	0.13	0.11
20 to 249 employees	0.30	0.38	0.23	0.49	0.40	0.40
250 + employees	0.66	0.54	0.72	0.40	0.47	0.49
B: EUROSTAT (SBS)						
0 to 19 employees	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.20	0.14	0.13
20 to 249 employees	0.27	0.21	0.27	0.41	0.38	0.36
250 + employees	0.65	0.74	0.64	0.39	0.49	0.51

Notes:

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Measuring TFP


- ▶ Total Factor Productivity (TFP)

$$\log TFP_{i,t} = \log(Y_{i,t} - M_{i,t}) - \alpha_1 \log L_{i,t} - \alpha_2 \log K_{i,t}$$

- Y: output, M: materials, L: employment and K: capital.
- α_1 and α_2 estimated, by country-sector, using the non-parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Wooldridge (2009) (WLP) that takes into account the Akerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) critique.
- ▶ We use revenue productivity (TFPR).
- ▶ There can be a role for firm-specific demand/mark-up changes as a result of change in ownership.


BvD compared to OECD database

Figure: Foreign Shares in Turnover: BvD vs. OECD Data



Notes: The shares from the BvD data are computed as the ratios of the aggregated foreign turnover to total turnover over firms i , sectors s_4 and countries c in the balanced (permanent) firm sample (solid line with diamonds) and in the full sample (dashed line with squares). Foreign presence from the OECD data (solid line with circles) is the sum of the multinational turnover in manufacturing divided by the total manufacturing turnover in these countries.

Foreign Ownership Distribution



Notes:

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