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Monetary Policy with Reserves and CBDC: Optimality, Equivalence, and Politics (Dirk Niepelt)

Event start date: 19.03.2021 17:00

Event end date: 19.03.2021 18:00

Open Research Seminar

On 19 March 2021, the National Bank of Ukraine hosted an open research seminar, during which Prof. Dirk Niepelt presented the research  "Monetary Policy with Reserves and CBDC: Optimality, Equivalence, and Politics", where he analyzes policy in a two-tiered monetary system. Model implies, that noncompetitive banks issue deposits while the central bank issues reserves and a retail CBDC. Monies differ with respect to operating costs and liquidity. This framework is mapped into a baseline business cycle model with "pseudo wedges" and optimal policy rules are derived: Spreads satisfy modified Friedman rules and deposits must be taxed or subsidized. The author generalizes the Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) result on the macro irrelevance of CBDC but shows that a deposit based payment system requires higher taxes. The model implies annual implicit subsidies to U.S. banks of up to 0:8 percent of GDP during the period 1999-2017.

 

Materials from the seminar are available via links below.